

# Chancellorsville and Gettysburg

By JOHN McILROY.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

**PREPARING THE LAST BLOW.**  
Lee, Defeated at All Points, Determines Upon One More Tremendous Blow. Longstreet Vainly Tries to Dissuade Him, but Is Ordered to Charge On. Center-Pickett's Division to Lead. Imposable Array of Artillery.

Defeated Everywhere.  
In spite of the headlong assaults and splendid valor of his soldiers, Lee saw himself defeated at every point. Longstreet's mighty effort to repeat the achievement of Chancellorsville up-

ordered to attack the next morning, and Gen. Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time. The latter, during the night, reinforced Gen. Johnson with two brigades from Rodde's and one from Early's Divisions. "Gen. Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected, but before notice could be sent to Gen. Ewell Gen. Johnson had already become engaged, and it was too late to recall him. The enemy attempted to recover the works taken the preceding evening, but was repulsed, and Gen. Johnson attacked in turn. "After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to

"As long as Gettysburg stands and the contour of its hills remains unchanged, students of the battlefield must decide that Lee's most promising attack from first to last was upon Cemetery Hill, by a concentrated fire from the north and assaults from the nearest sheltered ground between the west and northeast."

## Longstreet's Position.

From the first Longstreet had continued to urge upon Lee not to attack, but make a movement to the left to interpose between Meade and Washington. This would compel Meade to move out of the strong position into which his army had been hammered, and either retreat or attack Lee upon his own ground. But Lee had gotten a taste of victory, and would not be moved. He would hear of nothing but continuing the fighting.

Gen. Wofford, who commanded a brigade in McLaws's Division, says: "Lee and Longstreet came to my brigade Friday morning before the artillery opened fire. I told Lee that the afternoon would be nearly reached the crest. He asked if I could not go there now. I replied, 'No, General, I think not.'"

"He said quickly, 'Why not?' "Because," I said, "the enemy have had all night to intrench and reinforce. I had been pursuing a broken enemy, and the situation is now very different."

a terrible and destructive fire. With my knowledge of the situation I could see that the Federal and Confederate positions were intermingled. All their batteries were soon covered with smoke, through which the flashes were incessant, whilst the air seemed filled with shells, whose sharp explosions, with the hurrying of their fragments, formed a running accompaniment to the deep roar of the guns. Then I rode to the Artillery Reserve to order fresh batteries and ammunition to be sent up to the ridge as soon as the ammunition ceased; but both the reserve and the train had gone to a safer place. Messengers, however, had been left to receive and convey orders, which I sent them; then I returned to the ridge. Turning into the Tanager plantation, I saw evidence of the necessity under which the reserve had been "decamped," in the remains of a dozen exploded caissons, which had been placed by the enemy on the hill, but which the shells had "aged to safety."

In fact, the ridge was more dangerous because the ridge than on its crest, which had been reached at the position occupied by Gen. Newton behind McIlwain's batteries, from which we had a fine view, as all our own guns were now in action."

## (To be continued.)

## The 36th Ind.

Editor National Tribune: Will you please give a short history of the 36th Ind.—J. H. Singlet, Waukegan, Ill.

The 36th Ind., one of Fox's "Fighting Regiments," was organized at Fort Wayne, Sept. 24, 1864. On the expiration of its three years' term of service, the veterans and recruits were consolidated into a battalion of seven companies and a detachment from the 26th Ind. transferred to it as Co. H. July 12, 1865. The battalion was mustered out at Camp Sherman, Ohio, Sept. 10, 1865. It was commanded successively by Col. Sion S. Bus, who died April 7, 1862, of wounds received at Shiloh, succeeded by Col. Joseph B. Doolittle, and then by Capt. John W. Lawton, who was in command of the 36th Ind. at the battle of Shiloh, where it lost 12 killed, 115 wounded and two missing. At Stone River it fought in Johnson's Division, losing in that battle 11 killed, 110 wounded and 61 missing. After the fall of Atlanta it marched northward with the Fourth Corps, and was engaged in the battles of Franklin and Nashville. In that campaign the division was commanded by Kimball, Stanley having been promoted to command of the corps. It belonged to Stanley's Division, Fourth Corps, and out of a total enrollment of 1,126 lost 127 killed and 275 from disease, etc. Forty-three of its members died in Confederate prisons.—Editor National Tribune.

## Good News for the Deaf.

A celebrated New York artist has been selected to demonstrate to deaf people that deafness is a disease and can be cured rapidly and easily in your own home.

He proposes to prove this fact by sending to any person having trouble with their ears a trial treatment of this new method absolutely free. We advise all people who have trouble with their ears to immediately address Dr. Edward Gardner, Suite 212, No. 40 West Thirty-third street, New York City, and we wish to assure them that they will receive by return mail, absolutely free, a "Trial Treatment."

## The 2d Ill. L. A.

Editor National Tribune: Please give me number and name of each company of the 2d Ill. L. A., names of officers and losses of each, etc.—G. W. Hadley, Mt. Sterling, Ill.

There were 12 companies in the 2d Ill. L. A., Batteries A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, and M, respectively. These were organized from Aug. 17, 1861, to June 6, 1862, at Peoria, St. Charles, Cairo, Camp Butler, Springfield and Camp Douglas, and with the exception of D, E and M were mustered out at different dates during June, July and August, 1865. Battery A, "Davidson's," was commanded first by Capt. Peter Davidson, who was promoted to Major Sept. 10, 1863, and succeeded by Capt. Herman Borris. It belonged to Hovey's Division, Thirteenth Corps, and lost five killed and 17 from disease, etc. Battery B, "Madison's," was commanded first by Capt. Rely Madison, who died April 11, 1863, of disease, at Corinth, Miss., and afterward by Capt. Fletcher H. Chapman. It belonged to the Sixteenth Corps, and lost three killed and 27 from disease, etc. Battery C, "Pope's," was commanded by Capt. Caleb Hopkins, who resigned April 20, 1862, and was succeeded by Capt. James P. Flood. It lost four killed and 18 from disease, etc. Battery D, "Dresser's," was commanded by Capt.

Jasper M. Dresser, James P. Timony, and Chas. S. Cooper in turn, and belonged to W. S. Smith's Division, Sixteenth Corps, losing six killed and 15 from disease, etc. Battery E, "Schwartz's," was commanded by Capt. Adolph Schwartz, Geo. C. Gumbart and Geo. L. Nispele, respectively, belonged to Lauman's Division, Sixteenth Corps, and lost seven killed and 10 from disease, etc. Battery F, "Powell's," was commanded by Capt. John W. Powell, succeeded by Capt. Geo. B. Richardson on the promotion of the former to the rank of Major. It belonged to Gresham's Division, Seventeenth Corps, and lost five killed and 24 from disease, etc. Battery G, "Sparreström's," was commanded by Capt. Chas. J. Sparreström, Frederick Sparreström and John W. Lowell in turn, belonged to Logan's Division, Seventeenth Corps, and lost two killed and 25 from disease, etc. Battery H, "Stenbeck's," was commanded by Capt. Stenbeck and Henry C. Whittemore. It lost two killed and 23 from disease, etc. Battery I, "Barnett's," was commanded by Capt. Chas. Barnett, Chas. M. Barnett and J. A. Barnett in turn, belonged to Davis's Division, Fourteenth Corps, and lost five killed and 10 from disease, etc. Battery J, "Barber's," was commanded by Capt. Wm. H. Barber, Erasmus A. Nichols, and Thaddeus C. Hulanski, belonged to Logan's Division, Seventeenth Corps, and lost four killed and 24 from disease, etc. Battery K, "Phillips's," was commanded by Capt. John C. Phillips and then by Capt. John C. Phillips, belonged to the Reserve Artillery, Twenty-third Corps, and lost five killed and 16 from disease, etc.—Editor National Tribune.

## The 20th Mass.

Editor National Tribune: Please give a short history of the 20th Mass.—Geo. Turner, 554 Jefferson Place, Union Hill, N. Y.

The 20th Mass., one of Fox's "Fighting Regiments," was organized at Readville from August to September, 1861, and finally mustered out July 18, 1865. It was commanded successively by Col. William R. Lee, Francis W. Puffer, Paul J. Revere, and George N. Macy. Gen. Humphreys, who was in command of the Army of the Potomac, called the 20th one of the very best regiments in the service. At Fredericksburg, Va., it was engaged in the battle of the 7th Mich., it crossed the river in the face of the enemy's riflemen, who occupied the buildings on the opposite bank. Led by Col. Norman, it fought its way thru the main street of the city, exposed to a terrible fire from the windows and housetops, in the performance of its duty of clearing the street. It lost in this fight 25 killed and 138 wounded. At Gettysburg it lost 20 killed, 44 wounded, and 3 missing out of 12 officers and 118 men who went into that action. Col. Revere was mortally wounded in this desperate fight. The 20th sustained the greatest loss in battle of any Massachusetts regiment. It belonged to Gibbon's Division, Second Corps, and lost out of a total enrollment of 1,978, 369 killed and 149 from disease, etc. Sixty-three of its members died in Confederate prisons.—Editor National Tribune.

## The 179th N. Y.

Editor National Tribune: Will you please give a history of the 179th N. Y.—James A. Haddock, Rock Stream, N. Y.

The 179th N. Y. was organized at Elmira from July, 1862, to September, 1864, and mustered out July 1, 1865. It was commanded by Col. Wm. M. Gregg during its entire service, belonged to Potter's Division, Ninth Corps, and lost 48 killed and 118 from disease, etc. The regiment suffered particularly in front of Petersburg, where it lost Lieut. Col. Franklin B. Doty, Maj. John B. Sloan, Maj. John Barton, Capt. Daniel Blackford and others. It also took part in the fight at the Weldon Railroad, Poplar Spring Church and Hatcher's Run.—Editor National Tribune.

## The 11th Ky.

Editor National Tribune: I wish you would kindly give a short history of the 11th Ky.—D. E. Rhodes, Rockport, Ky.

The 11th Ky. was organized at Camp Calhoun, Dec. 3, 1861, and mustered out in December, 1864. It was commanded by Col. Pierce B. Hawkins, who resigned June 25, 1863, succeeded by Col. S. F. Feltus, who resigned July 19, 1864. It belonged to Cox's Division, Twenty-third Corps, and lost 47 killed and 317 from disease, etc.—Editor National Tribune.

## The 5th Wis. Battery.

Editor National Tribune: Will you please give the 5th Wis. Battery a little write-up?—Joseph Hayburn, St. Helens, Ore.

The 5th Wis. Battery, "Pinney's," was organized at Milwaukee Oct. 1, 1861, and the organization composed of veterans and recruits finally mustered

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out June 6, 1865. It was first commanded by Capt. Oscar F. Pinney, who died Feb. 17, 1865, of wounds received at Stone River, succeeded by Capt. Chas. H. Humphreys, who resigned April 23, 1862. Capt. George G. Gardner then took command, resigning Nov. 4, 1864, and followed by Capt. Joseph McKnight, in command at the time of muster-out. It belonged to Davis's Division, Fourteenth Corps, and lost six killed and 119 from disease, etc.—Editor National Tribune.

## The 12th Pa. Cav.

Editor National Tribune: Please give a sketch of the 12th Pa. Cav.—Freeman Nichols, Marlinton, Pa.

The 12th Pa. Cav., also called the 12th Pa., was organized at Philadelphia from December, 1861, to April, 1862, and finally mustered out July 29, 1865. It was commanded by Col. Lewis B. Pierce, who was discharged Dec. 15, 1864, succeeded by Col. Marcus A. Rano, a graduate of West Point, who was in command at the time of final muster-out. It belonged to Averell's Division, Cavalry Corps, and lost 34 killed and 108 from disease, etc.—Editor National Tribune.

## Kidney Disease.

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## The 74th Pa.

Editor National Tribune: Please give a sketch of the 74th Pa.—Christian Heitzman, Galveston, Tex.

The 74th Pa. was organized at Pottsville, Sept. 20, 1861, and finally mustered out Aug. 23, 1865. It was commanded by Col. A. Schimpff, who was promoted, Nov. 29, 1862, to Brigadier-General, succeeded by Col. Adolph von Hartung, who was discharged July 1, 1864. At the time of final muster-out the regiment was under the command of Col. Gottlieb H. Schurz, Eleventh Corps, and lost 56 killed and 86 from disease, etc.—Editor National Tribune.

## The 15th Ohio.

Editor National Tribune: Please give a short sketch of the 15th Ohio.—J. W. White, New Concord, O.


The 15th Ohio, one of Fox's fighting regiments, was organized in the State at large in September, 1861, and finally mustered out Nov. 21, 1865. It was first commanded by Col. Moses R. Dickey, who resigned Oct. 24, 1862, followed by Col. Wm. Wallace, who was discharged July 19, 1864. Col. Frank Askew then took command, retaining the same till muster-out. It belonged to Woods's Division, Fourth Corps, and lost 173 killed and 136 from disease, etc.—Editor National Tribune.

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THE POSITION OF BOTH SIDES AFTER NOON JULY 3.

on the Union side had failed bloodily. It is true that the Union troops had been driven, but only a short distance, and they had exacted a frightful price for every foot of the ground they had yielded that Longstreet's shattered battalions lay mangled and exhausted behind the ground for which they had fought. They had drawn their broken ranks together, and withdrawn to their original positions, back of the Emmitsburg road, as the Union troops suddenly retired from the blood-stained Wheatfield and Peach Orchard. Many of Longstreet's best officers had fallen; many of his best brigades had been disintegrated. Lee's right wing had fared almost as badly. Heth's and Pender's fine divisions had been torn to pieces by the fierceness of the struggle for Seminary Ridge. Johnson's Division had been destroyed for the time being by the rescue from Culp's Hill. Early's Division had suffered severely in the first day's fighting, and the failure of the attack on Cemetery Hill.

Assuming that there were approximately an equal force—to wit, about 20,000 men, infantry and artillery—on each side, Lee had his men divided into nine strong divisions, averaging 7,000 men each, while Meade had his in 12 weak divisions, making his average about 2,833 each. Of Lee's nine divisions seven had been heavily engaged, and at least five pounded to the last limit of endurance.

Of Meade's 12 divisions, 14 had been heavily engaged and eight so terribly hammered that they were considered as almost virtually out of action. These were three of the First Corps, one of the Second, two of the Third and two of the Fifth Corps, and two of the Twelfth had already done heavy fighting, but were still in excellent shape for more.

That is, Lee had virtually expended five-ninths of his army, and had exhausted eight-ninths of Meade's force in doing so. Three-ninths of Lee's army and five-ninths of Meade's army had been heavily engaged, but were in good shape for further fighting. Only one division—one-ninth—of Lee's army had not done any fighting, while five divisions—five-ninths—of Meade's army, had had no share in the battle.

To state the proposition in other words, while only one-ninth of Lee's army remained fresh and unfought, nearly one-quarter of Meade's army had not been in action.

The Union army had been hammered into a strong position, holding the Round Top strongly, the left flank was entirely secure, and Johnson's and Early's disastrous assault on Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill showed that the right flank was hopelessly unassailable. Lee had already suffered as complete a defeat as he had inflicted at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. If the battle had ended there, as it would have done with most commanders, Lee would have passed into the class of Burnside and Hooker.

He determined to make one more desperate effort—forlorn hope—to win the battle. It must be said in defense of this decision that when it was made, on the evening of the 2d, Gen. Lee believed that his army had gained much more substantial successes than it had. He says in his report made in January, 1864:

"The result of the day's operations induced the belief that, with the proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battlefield during the afternoon of the 2d, was

abandon part of his intrenchments. Gen. Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly fortified crest of the hill. The projected attack on Second Corps' left not having been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to that of Gen. Johnson, and finally thrust his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original position about 1 p. m.

Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high, rocky hills on the enemy's extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His operations had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws. He was therefore reinforced by Heth's Division and two brigades of Pender's, to the command of which Maj. Gen. Trimble was assigned. Gen. Hill was directed to hold his line with the rest of his command, and Gen. Longstreet assistance, if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained."

Gen. Alexander's View.  
Gen. E. P. Alexander says of this: "This statement shows that the strongest features of the enemy's position were not yet apprehended. These were the ability of the enemy to concentrate their whole force upon a point attacked, and the impressive character of the two Federal flanks."

Gen. Alexander was sure that the most effective attack could be made on Longstreet's position. He says: "I stated to Gen. Lee that I had been examining the ground over to the right, and was much inclined to think that the best thing was to move to the Federal left."

"No," he said, "I am going to take them where they are, on Cemetery Hill. I want you to take Pickett's Division and make the attack. I will reinforce you with two divisions of the Third Corps."

"That will give me 15,000 men," I replied. "I have been a soldier, I may say, from the ranks up to the position I now hold. I have been in pretty much all kinds of skirmishes, from those of two or three soldiers up to those of an army corps, and I think I can safely say there never was a body of 15,000 men who could make that attack successfully."

"The General seemed a little impatient at my remarks, so I said nothing more. As he showed no indications of changing his plan, I went to work at once to arrange my troops for the attack. First, I put in position, and received his directions for the line of his advance, as indicated by Gen. Lee. The divisions of the Third Corps were arranged along his left, with orders to take up the line of march, as Pickett passed before them, in short echelon. We were to open with our batteries, and Pickett was to move out as soon as we

silenced the Federal batteries. The artillery combat was begun with the rapid discharge of two field pieces as our signal. As soon as the orders were communicated along the line I sent Col. E. P. Alexander, who was commanding a battalion of artillery, and who had been an engineer officer, to select carefully a point from which he could observe the effect of our batteries. When he could discover the enemy's batteries silenced or crippled, he should give notice to Gen. Pickett, who was ordered, upon receipt of that notice, to move forward to the attack. When I took Pickett to the crest of Seminary Ridge and explained where his troops should be sheltered, and pointed out the direction Gen. Lee wished him to take, and upon which he was about to enter, but was quite hopeful of success. Upon the receipt of notice he was to march over the crest of the hill down the gentle slope and up the rise opposite the Federal Round Top could have been suppressed by the Confederate batteries. The Confederate artillery was always inferior to the Federal in numbers, calibers and quality of ammunition. It would have stood no chance with the Union artillery in position and fortified. He says:

"The great extent of ground occupied by the enemy's batteries was evident that the artillery on our west front, whether of the army corps or the reserve, must concur as a unit, under the Chief of Artillery, in the defense. This he provided for in all well-organized armies by special rules, which formerly were contained in our own army regulations, but they had been condensed in successive editions into a few short lines, so obscure as to be virtually worthless, because, like the rudimentary toe of the dog's paw, they had become, like the rudimentary toe, so unrecognizable and so unrecognizable to the specialist, that it was of the first importance to subject the enemy's infantry, from the first motion of the assault, to such a crushing fire of our artillery as would break their formation, check their impulse, and drive them back, or at least bring them to a halt in a condition as to make them an easy prey. There was neither time nor necessity for reporting this to Gen. Meade, and beginning on the right, I directed the chiefs of artillery and battery commanders to hold their fire for 15 or 20 minutes after the cannonade commenced, then to concentrate their fire with all possible accuracy on the enemy's batteries, and most destructive to us, but slowly, so

that when the enemy's ammunition was exhausted we should have sufficient left to meet the assault. I had just given these orders to the last battery on Little Round Top, when the signal gun was fired and the enemy opened with all his guns. From that point the scene was indescribably grand. All their batteries were soon covered with smoke, through which the flashes were incessant, whilst the air seemed filled with shells, whose sharp explosions, with the hurrying of their fragments, formed a running accompaniment to the deep roar of the guns. Then I rode to the Artillery Reserve to order fresh batteries and ammunition to be sent up to the ridge as soon as the ammunition ceased; but both the reserve and the train had gone to a safer place. Messengers, however, had been left to receive and convey orders, which I sent them; then I returned to the ridge. Turning into the Tanager plantation, I saw evidence of the necessity under which the reserve had been "decamped," in the remains of a dozen exploded caissons, which had been placed by the enemy on the hill, but which the shells had "aged to safety."

In fact, the ridge was more dangerous because the ridge than on its crest, which had been reached at the position occupied by Gen. Newton behind McIlwain's batteries, from which we had a fine view, as all our own guns were now in action."

On the extreme right the Twelfth Corps had only followed Johnson a short distance, and then settled down to strengthen their position. It had taken the night before. On its left was Wadsworth's Division of the First Corps; then the Eleventh Corps, with its right flank resting on Seminary Ridge, and its left flank on the hill after its fierce and successful charge of the previous evening. Next came Robinson's Division of the Second Corps, and the Division of the Second and Doubleday's of the First. To the latter had been added Stannard's Brigade of Vermont nine-months men—the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th Vt. This had reached the battlefield too late to take part in the first day's battle. The 12th and 15th Vt. had been detached by Gen. Reynolds's order to guard the rear of the First Corps, and came up and took its place in the brigade, but was again ordered back to the wagons."


Next in line came Caldwell's Division of the Second Corps, and on its left the Third Corps, joining on to the Fifth, which held the extreme left of the line, and the Round Top.

Gen. Hunt's Description.  
"Compactly arranged on its crest was McIlwain's artillery, 41 guns, consisting of his own batteries, reinforced by others from the Artillery Reserve. To the right, in front of Hays and Gibbon, was the artillery of the Second Corps under its chief, Capt. Hazard. Wood's Battery was in Ziegler's Grove; on his left, in succession, Arnold's Rhode Island, Cushing's United States, Brown's Rhode Island and Kory's New York. On the right of the preceding day the two last-named batteries had been to the front and suffered severely. Lieut. T. Fred Brown was severely wounded, and his command devolved on Lieut. Perrin. So great had been the loss in men and horses that they were now of four guns each, reducing the total number in the corps to 25. Daniel Butterfield's battery of muskets, guns, was at the angle. Cowan's 1st N. Y. Battery, six pieces, was placed on the left of Kory's soon after the cannonade commenced. It never was a body of 15,000 men who could make that attack successfully."

"The General seemed a little impatient at my remarks, so I said nothing more. As he showed no indications of changing his plan, I went to work at once to arrange my troops for the attack. First, I put in position, and received his directions for the line of his advance, as indicated by Gen. Lee. The divisions of the Third Corps were arranged along his left, with orders to take up the line of march, as Pickett passed before them, in short echelon. We were to open with our batteries, and Pickett was to move out as soon as we

PHOTOGRAPHIC VIEW OF THE GROUND OVER WHICH PICKETT CHARGED, AS SEEN FROM THE UNION POSITION.

(The clump of trees and Webb Monument are on the left and Codori's house on the right of the picture.)



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